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ACCESS TO COURTS AND PREEMPTION 
OF STATE REMEDIES IN COLLECTIVE 
ACTION PERSPECTIVE 
Richard E. Levy† and Robert L. Glicksman‡ 
The extent to which federal law may preempt state common law 
tort remedies, thereby limiting litigants’ access to court, is an  
increasingly important issue.1 Businesses that produce and sell  
products increasingly assert preemption defenses against product 
liability and related lawsuits by injured consumers based on  
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1
 The issue gained added urgency with the Supreme Court’s decision in Geier v.  
American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000), which held that a savings clause in the  
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 explicitly exempting common law tort  
remedies from the effect of the Act’s express preemption provision did not prevent application 
of the implied preemption doctrine. Most recently, the Supreme Court addressed this issue in 
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). See infra notes 89–99 (discussing the implications of 
Wyeth for our analysis). Other recent examples of cases addressing these issues are legion. See, 
e.g., Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008) (holding that the Federal Cigarette 
Labeling and Advertising Act neither explicitly nor implicitly preempted claim of alleged 
violation of state unfair trade practices act in connection with marketing of light cigarettes); 
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008) (holding that patient’s common-law claims of 
negligence, strict liability, and implied warranty against manufacturer of catheter were 
preempted by FDA premarket approval process); Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 
(2002) (holding that plaintiff’s claim based on failure to install propeller guards on boat engine 
was not preempted by the Federal Boat Safety Act or the Coast Guard’s decision not to adopt 
regulation requiring propeller guards); Lindsey v. Caterpillar, Inc., 480 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(holding that worker’s products liability claim was not preempted by OSHA requirements for 
rollover protective structures for material-handling equipment); Witty v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 
366 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that federal aviation regulations preempted claim based 
on failure to warn of the risk of forming blood clots from remaining seated in a pressurized 
cabin for a long duration); Richardson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 578 F. Supp. 2d 1073 
(E.D. Wis. 2008) (holding that Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act did not 
impliedly preempt state law). 
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regulations establishing health and/or safety standards that apply to 
their products.2 At the same time, political and legal developments 
have made it more difficult to adopt strong health and safety  
regulations.3 Thus, preemption of state tort remedies may lock in 
weak federal regulations, prevent states from protecting citizens, and 
leave consumers without adequate recourse against dangerous or  
unhealthy products. Nonetheless, there may be good reasons for 
federal law to be designed or construed so as to preempt state 
remedies.  
“Remedial preemption” raises fundamental questions about the 
proper allocation of authority between the federal and state  
governments and about the role of courts in interpreting statutes and 
providing remedies for those who suffer injuries.4 At bottom,  
remedial preemption cases present the same basic questions, even if 
the answers to those questions will inevitably vary depending on the 
specific federal statutes and state remedies at issue. Developing a 
workable framework for analyzing remedial preemption issues can 
therefore help to ensure an appropriate accommodation of the federal 
and state interests at stake and promote consistent application of  
preemption doctrine to state judicial remedies.  
In a previous article, we developed a “collective action”  
framework for preemption analysis and applied it to the issue of state 
environmental regulations addressing the problem of global climate 
change.5 In this contribution to the symposium, we apply that  
approach to the issue of remedial preemption. Our analysis suggests 
that while remedial preemption may be justified in some cases, courts 
should not lightly infer remedial preemption unless: (1) a primary  
purpose of the federal law is to ensure uniform standards to promote 
                                                                                                                 
2
 See Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A 
Preliminary Empirical Assessment, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 44–45 (2006) (discussing 
emergence of federal preemption as a prominent field of study and attributing heightened 
interest in the field to, among other things, “the increased resort of [business] defendants to 
federal preemption defenses”). Industry reliance on federal regulation as a defense to state 
remedies reflects a certain degree of irony insofar as these same defendants often opposed the 
adoption of statutes or promulgation of regulations on which they now rely. A prominent 
example of this phenomenon concerns tobacco warnings.  
3
 See Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on  
Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate 
Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 580–84 (2008) (discussing political and legal developments 
that have led to an era of “regulatory skepticism”). 
4
 We use the term, “remedial preemption,” for purposes of convenience to refer to federal 
preemption of state judicial remedies for injured plaintiffs. Our primary concern here is with 
monetary remedies available in state tort law causes of action (particularly products liability 
actions), but remedies also may be available for causes of action based on state contract (such as 
breach of warranty) or property law. 
5
 See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 3.  
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free movement of goods, prevent the export of regulatory burdens by 
“downstream” states, or solve a not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY)  
problem; and (2) there is strong evidence that state judicial remedies 
(as opposed to direct state regulation through legislation or the actions 
of administrative agencies) would interfere with the achievement of 
those goals. In addition, we conclude that preemption of one common 
law cause of action does not necessarily warrant preemption of  
different causes of action for remediation of the same injury. Finally, 
we argue that courts should be especially reluctant to read the  
preemptive effect of federal law so as to leave injured persons without 
any remedy whatsoever.  
Our argument proceeds in three parts. Part I of the Article 
describes the basic collective action framework for analyzing 
remedial preemption issues. This discussion identifies important 
differences among various kinds of preemption, develops the essential 
premises of our framework, and considers the kinds of federal 
purposes that might justify preemption of more stringent state health 
and safety regulation. Part II of the Article applies this framework to 
the problem of remedial preemption, with particular attention to the 
ways in which state judicial remedies differ from state regulation by 
means of statutes or administrative rules, including the differences 
between legislatures and courts, between legislative rules and judicial 
decisions, and among possible preemptive effects on judicial 
remedies. Part III analyzes how the Supreme Court’s 2009 decision6 
holding that state tort remedies based on failure-to-warn claims were 
not preempted by federal regulation of the content of warning labels 
for drugs comports with our analysis. A final section summarizes our 
conclusions and their implications.   
I. COLLECTIVE ACTION AND PREEMPTION 
In this part of the Article, we articulate the basic elements of our 
collective action framework for preemption and its application to  
remedial preemption issues. We begin by drawing some basic  
distinctions among certain kinds of preemption that prove useful in 
focusing the issues. We then identify the basic premises of our  
approach, including a strong presumption against preemption, the 
central role of federal statutory purposes in preemption analysis, and 
the relevance of collective action principles in understanding the  
significance of federal statutory purposes for preemption analysis. 
Finally, we consider the kinds of federal purposes that might support 
                                                                                                                 
6
 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). 
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preemption of state judicial remedies that effectively impose more 
stringent health and safety standards on defendants. 
A. Types of Preemption 
As an initial matter, it is important to clarify some basic  
distinctions that we will use throughout the discussion. The first  
distinction is between preemption as a result of a “direct conflict” 
between state and federal law, on the one hand, and preemption that 
occurs because federal law “displaces” state authority in a given area, 
on the other. The second is a distinction between what may be called 
“floor” preemption and “ceiling” preemption. 
1. Direct Conflicts vs. Displacement of State Authority 
Traditional preemption doctrine distinguishes between express and 
implied preemption, and between two kinds of implied preemption, 
federal occupation of the field and conflict preemption.7 Under this 
traditional analysis, implied occupation of the field arises when  
federal regulation is so pervasive and federal interests are so  
dominant that state law is completely preempted in the entire field. 
Conflict preemption arises either when it is impossible to comply 
with both federal and state law, or when the state law stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment of the object and purpose of the  
federal law.  
The distinction between direct conflict preemption and  
displacement preemption is similar to, but different from, the  
traditional distinction between “conflict” preemption and “occupation 
of the field” preemption. Direct conflict preemption applies not only 
when it is impossible to comply with both federal and state law, but 
also when the state law, on its face, creates a direct and clear conflict 
with federal law.8 Thus, direct conflict preemption is broader than the 
“impossibility of compliance” strand of conflict preemption, but  
narrower than the “obstacle to the accomplishment of federal  
objectives” strand.9 For example, if a state permit allowed the  
                                                                                                                 
7
 See, e.g., Mary J. Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and 
the FDA, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1089, 1114 (2007) (referring to “the now-standard categories of  
occupation of the field preemption and conflict preemption” (footnotes omitted)); Mary J. 
Davis, On Preemption, Congressional Intent, and Conflict of Laws, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 181, 
199–200 (2004); Susan Raeker-Jordan, The Pre-Emption Presumption That Never Was: Pre-
Emption Doctrine Swallows the Rule, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1379, 1383–84 (1998). 
8
 See generally Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 260–61 (2000)  
(advocating a “logical-contradiction test”). 
9
 In Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009), the majority rejected an impossibility of 
compliance argument, stressing that “[i]mpossibility pre-emption is a demanding defense.” Id. 
at 1199. 
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dumping of toxic waste in violation of federal law, there would be a 
direct conflict and federal law would preempt the permit, which could 
not serve as a defense to an enforcement action based on the federal 
violation (absent an express savings provision).10   
Displacement of state authority operates more broadly to prevent 
the state from exercising its authority in a particular regulatory area or 
manner, and includes not only traditional field preemption, but also 
the broad application of the strand of conflict preemption based on an 
obstacle to the accomplishment of federal purposes or objectives. 
Thus, for example, if federal law strikes a careful balance between 
regulatory burdens and health benefits, state laws imposing more 
stringent regulations might stand as an obstacle to the purpose of 
striking this balance, even if the requirements for federal occupation 
of the field are not met. In such a case, state regulatory authority is 
displaced broadly. 
When there is a direct conflict between federal and state law, the 
superiority of federal law follows directly from the Supremacy Clause 
(whether or not it is possible to comply with both).11 To illustrate the 
difference between direct conflicts and displacement, suppose that a 
federal agency adopts health and safety regulations governing the 
operation of power plants. Even if the federal regulations include 
standards for siting power plants, preemption of state and local zoning 
authority would require a strong showing of congressional intent to 
                                                                                                                 
10
 Although the conflict between state and federal law is clear and direct, this conflict 
would not fall within the impossibility of compliance strand of conflict preemption because the 
regulated party could comply with both federal and state law by electing not to exercise the 
permit. In his concurring opinion in Wyeth, Justice Thomas argued in favor of an approach 
similar to ours, noting that the Court “has not explained why a narrow ‘physical impossibility’ 
standard is the best proxy for determining when state and federal laws ‘directly conflict’ for 
purposes of the Supremacy Clause.” Id. at 1209 (Thomas, J., concurring). He went on to observe 
that “if federal law gives an individual the right to engage in certain behavior that state law 
prohibits, the laws would give contradictory commands notwithstanding the fact that an 
individual could comply with both by electing to refrain from the covered behavior.” Id. Justice 
Thomas rejected other forms of implied conflict preemption altogether as an improper judicial 
extension of statutes. See id. at 1205 (“I write separately, however, because I cannot join the 
majority’s implicit endorsement of far-reaching implied pre-emption doctrines. In particular, I 
have become increasingly skeptical of this Court’s ‘purposes and objectives’ pre-emption 
jurisprudence.”). We are sympathetic to Justice Thomas’s position, although we are not  
prepared at this point to advocate the complete rejection of displacement of state authority based 
on the “obstacle” strand of federal preemption. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 3, at 591 
n.56. At a minimum, there should be very strong evidence of congressional intent to oust state 
law to support implied displacement of state authority. 
11
 Thus, for example, in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 (1819), the 
Court held that taxation of a national bank was preempted by federal law even though it was 
possible for the national bank to comply with the state law by paying the tax. See Glicksman & 
Levy, supra note 3, at 588 n.44. See generally Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of  
Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767 (1994) (distinguishing between “supremacy” and  
“preemption” and arguing that preemption is not justified by the Supremacy Clause, but rather 
by the Necessary and Proper Clause). 
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displace that authority, given the traditional control that states and  
localities have had over land use decisions. But if the federal agency 
issued a permit approving the location of a particular proposed power 
plant, that permit would preempt application of even a pre-existing 
zoning law (such as one that permits only residential use at the  
location of the proposed plant) to block construction of the plant. The 
zoning law would be in direct conflict with the federal permit, even 
though it would be possible to comply with both sets of laws by not 
building the plant.12  
By way of contrast, field preemption, or a broad conclusion that 
certain general categories of state regulation stand as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment of the object and purpose of federal law,  
effectively displaces state authority to act in a given area.13 It is the 
displacement of state authority to provide judicial remedies that  
concerns us here. This sort of displacement, which rests on the  
conclusion that the retention of state regulatory authority is  
inconsistent with the purposes of federal law, represents a significant 
interference with the interests of states. 
2. Floor and Ceiling Preemption 
A second distinction that informs our approach is the distinction 
between “floor” and “ceiling” preemption, which we borrow from 
William Buzbee.14 As the terms suggest, floor preemption occurs 
when federal law sets a minimum standard of regulation or protection, 
establishing a floor that state laws cannot lower, but leaving states the 
option of providing more stringent protections. In the context of state 
and federal remedies, floor preemption would prevent compliance 
with a less stringent state law from operating as a defense to a federal 
remedy for violation of federal law. Floor preemption would not 
impose any restrictions, however, on state remedies that offer greater 
                                                                                                                 
12
 To borrow the terminology of Thomas Merrill, this sort of preemption means that  
federal law “trumps” state law, but does not displace state authority to enact laws in the area. 
See Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 730–31 
(2008) (explaining that displacement “occurs when state law in a particular area is nullified or 
wiped out, leaving federal law as the sole source of legal obligation,” while trumping “occurs 
when the wiping out or displacement of federal law by state law is prohibited”).   
13
 See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 886 (2000) (holding action 
alleging defective design of automobile because of the absence of a driver’s side airbag was 
preempted because it conflicted with the objectives of a safety standard issued by the 
Department of Transportation under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 
even though the suit was not covered by the statute’s express preemption clause). 
14
 See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the 
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547 (2007). Both the Supreme Court and the 
FDA used this terminology in Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1193, 1199–1200 (2009). See 
infra note 93 and accompanying text (quoting examples). 
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protection than those provided by federal law. Floor preemption is the 
norm with federal health and safety standards, and would seem to 
follow inherently from the federal action imposing a minimum 
standard.15  
Ceiling preemption, on the other hand, precludes states from 
adopting more stringent or protective regulations. Remedial  
preemption presents issues of ceiling, rather than floor preemption. 
The essential argument for remedial preemption is that state remedies 
are a form of regulation that effectively impose higher regulatory 
standards than those imposed by federal law. Note that remedial  
preemption thus raises two distinct questions: whether federal law 
should be interpreted as having ceiling preemptive effect on more 
stringent regulatory standards; and, if so, whether state judicial  
remedies should be understood as imposing such standards. 
B. Basic Premises 
Our framework for preemption analysis rests on three basic  
premises. First, we believe that there should be a strong presumption 
against remedial preemption. Second, we argue that, in the absence of 
explicit statutory language, the presumption against remedial  
preemption is overcome only when it is clear that state remedies 
would interfere with the primary purposes of the federal law. Finally, 
we believe that the relevant federal purposes in the context of  
preemption analysis are the purposes that, as understood in collective 
action terms, justify regulation at the federal, rather than state level. 
1. The Presumption Against Preemption 
The Supreme Court has often stated that there is a presumption 
against preemption, although it has also indicated that the  
presumption may not apply in some areas of dominant federal  
concern, and it has not consistently accorded the presumption the 
same weight.16 Whatever the general scope and force of the  
                                                                                                                 
15
 Indeed, this sort of floor preemption would seem to follow even without displacement 
of state authority, because the assertion of compliance with a lower state standard as a defense 
would directly conflict with the operation of federal law and thus be trumped by it.  
Displacement of state authority to establish lower standards would not be necessary, however, to 
achieve minimum levels of protection, since the parallel enforcement of state remedies, even 
those imposing less protective standards, would not interfere with the federal minimum unless it 
prevented a later prosecution. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 3, at 583 n.19. In effect, the 
party who violated both the federal standard and the state’s less protective standard would be 
subject to a greater chance of prosecution and higher penalties as a result of violating both 
standards. 
16
 The majority and dissent disagreed about the application of the presumption against 
preemption in Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). See infra notes 90–92 and 
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presumption, it should have special weight as applied to remedial 
preemption of state judicial remedies because the federalism and  
institutional concerns that justify the presumption are particularly 
powerful in this context. 
The primary justification for the presumption against preemption 
is respect for the sovereign authority of states. This respect is  
especially justified in the area of tort remedies, which have  
traditionally been a matter of state law. Indeed, many state  
constitutions, including the constitution of our home state, Kansas, 
specifically recognize the right of injured citizens to a “remedy by 
due course of law.”17 Given the importance attached by the states to 
providing such remedies, Congress should be especially cautious 
about displacing state authority to provide them, and courts should be 
especially cautious about inferring the intent to do so in the absence 
of explicit statutory language. 
The presumption against preemption of state judicial remedies can 
be understood both as a principle of legislative draftsmanship and as a 
quasi-constitutional clear statement principle. As a principle of  
legislative draftsmanship, the presumption reasons that insofar as 
Congress may expressly provide for preemption of state remedies, the 
failure to do so raises an inference that remedial preemption was not 
intended.18 As a quasi-constitutional clear statement principle, the 
presumption against preemption implements federalism principles by 
prompting courts to read ambiguous statutes to avoid unnecessary 
intrusions on state authority to provide common law remedies.19 




 KAN. CONST., BILL OF RIGHTS, § 18 (“All persons, for injuries suffered in person,  
reputation or property, shall have remedy by due course of law, and justice administered without 
delay.”). 
18
 This rationale also applies to express preemption provisions applicable to state law 
“standards,” “requirements,” “prohibitions,” or similar terms. Congress’s failure to use language 
that addresses remedies is significant, since the primary function of state judicial remedies is to 
provide compensation for injured individuals, rather than to establish regulatory standards, 
requirements, or prohibitions—even if the award of compensation has incidental regulatory 
effects. See THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR: WHEN FEDERAL BUREAUCRACIES 
TRUMP LOCAL JURIES 232 (2008) (“The primary function of the common law is to dispense 
corrective justice by forcing those who have unlawfully damaged others to compensate their 
victims.”); id. at 252 (“[C]orrective justice is the primary function of the common law of  
torts . . . .”). Courts should not interpret such express preemption provisions to cover state 
judicial remedies absent a showing that those remedies interfere with the purposes of the federal 
legislation, and the burden of proving such interference (through empirical evidence, for  
example) should be on the party arguing in favor of preemption. For further discussion of the 
purposes and effects of state judicial remedies, see infra Part II.B.  
19
 This approach recognizes the constitutional role of states as a counterweight to the  
assertion of federal power, while acknowledging the supremacy of federal law. It assumes that 
Congress respects that role and does not lightly infer congressional intent to displace state 
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Taken together, these principles also suggest a political process 
rationale for the presumption—by requiring Congress to address the 
preemptive effect of statutes explicitly, the presumption reinforces the 
political safeguards of federalism.20 
A comparison to the problem of implied private rights of action is 
particularly instructive. In Cort v. Ash,21 the Supreme Court curtailed 
the recognition of implied federal causes of action, stressing a  
negative inference from Congress’s failure to provide an express 
cause of action. In the wake of Cort, it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to establish an implied right of action under federal statutes.22 The 
                                                                                                                 
 
authority, particularly in areas of constitutional importance to states. 
20
 See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. 
REV. 1321, 1328–29 (2001) (discussing how federal lawmaking procedures safeguard 
federalism). Unlike federal agencies or federal courts, senators and representatives in Congress 
are politically accountable to geographic constituencies. Even if these political safeguards 
operate imperfectly, they are the constitutionally designed mechanism for protecting state 
interests in the legislative process. Note that this analysis suggests critical differences between 
preemption as a result of federal statutes and preemption as a result of administrative 
regulations, insofar as agencies are not subject to the political safeguards of federalism. The 
Supreme Court has held that an agency’s authority to promulgate regulatory standards did not 
include the authority to decide the preemptive scope of the statute because the statute did not 
clearly delegate the latter authority. See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649–50 
(1990); see also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 263 (2006) (rejecting an interpretive rule 
adopted by the attorney general because “[t]he statutory terms . . . do not call on the Attorney 
General, or any other executive official, to make an independent assessment of the meaning of 
federal law”). Likewise, in Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009), the Court declined to defer 
to the FDA’s conclusions regarding the preemptive effect of federal drug labeling requirements. 
See infra note 96. This is an important and fascinating issue whose implications we will not 
explore in this Article. See generally Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency 
Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 695 (2008); Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability 
Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449 (2008); Catherine M. 
Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 
DEPAUL L. REV. 227 (2007); Karen Jordan, Opening the Door to Hard-Look Review of Agency 
Preemption, 31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 353 (2009).  
21
 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
22
 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72  
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1083 (1997) (“The creation of wholly new implied rights of action has 
largely passed from the scene.”); Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to 
Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 
1097, 1127 n.113 (2006) (“The Cort and Cannon decisions are, in retrospect, largely  
doctrinal rest stops on the path from a rule conceptualizing the adoption of appropriate remedies 
as a proper equitable function for the courts to one in which the courts are powerless to  
extrapolate remedies beyond those that Congress expressly established or clearly intended but 
simply forgot to memorialize.”); Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private  
Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 
102–05 (2005) (describing how “[t]he standards used by courts to determine whether to imply a 
private right of action have changed substantially in the last thirty years”); see also H. Miles 
Foy, III, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and Implied Private Actions in the State 
and Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 521–22 (1986) (asserting that various arguments 
for how to infer congressional intent in the face of textual silence “are not about actual 
legislative intentions; they are designed for cases in which there is no hard evidence of 
legislative intentions. These legal arguments masquerade as arguments about legislative facts. 
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Court has not always applied the presumption against implied  
preemption with equal vigor, however. As a result, the failure to  
include an express preemption clause in the statute does not  
necessarily preclude a finding of implied preemption. The  
juxtaposition of these two tendencies has particular significance if a 
federal regulatory statute is silent with respect to both remedial  
preemption and a federal cause of action. Because the Court appears 
to be more willing to infer remedial preemption than to infer an  
implied right of action, the result could well be the preemption of 
state remedies without the provision of any substitute federal  
remedy—even though Congress was silent on both issues.23 
2. The Purposes of Federal Law 
In general terms, the extent to which state authority is displaced by 
federal law depends on the purposes of the federal law. This is true 
whether courts are interpreting the scope of an ambiguous express 
preemption provision, determining the existence or scope of federal 
occupation of the field, or assessing the displacement of state  
authority to prevent the exercise of that authority from impeding the 
accomplishment of the object and purpose of federal law.24 Given the 
concerns articulated above, the presumption against remedial  
preemption should not be lightly overcome and requires careful  
attention to the extent to which state remedial authority would  
interfere with the attainment of the purposes of federal law. 
Of particular relevance here is the extent to which most federal 
laws have multiple purposes of varying degrees of centrality. We  
believe it is important to distinguish between the primary or principal 
purposes of a statute—those justifications that were central to a  
statute’s adoption—and secondary purposes that might have been 
articulated during the legislative process. In the absence of an express 
remedial preemption provision, courts should be especially reluctant 
                                                                                                                 
 
At bottom, they are legal arguments about the adjudicatory consequences that should be  
assigned to legislative silence by operation of law.”). 
23
 Cf. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993) (denying the availability of a right 
of action under ERISA against non-fiduciaries, even though express preemption provision 
barred state remedies, thus leaving the intended statutory beneficiaries of ERISA without any 
remedy). Justice Thomas’s position in Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009), however, 
appears to treat implied preemption, in the sense of displacement of state authority, similarly to 
implied rights of action. See supra note 10. 
24
 See generally Glicksman & Levy, supra note 3, at 585–89 (discussing the relevance  
of purposes to various types of preemption). In contrast, when there is a direct conflict it  
is unnecessary to determine federal statutory purposes because the conflict itself requires  
preemption under the Supremacy Clause. 
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to infer remedial preemption based solely on secondary statutory  
purposes. For example, when the principal purposes of federal law 
relate to ensuring minimum health and safety standards (establishing 
a floor), a court should be reluctant to infer displacement of state  
remedial authority based on a secondary purpose of promoting  
uniformity or balancing economic and health or safety considerations. 
Of course, the characterization of such purposes as primary or  
secondary may be disputed and unclear, especially because statutory 
provisions that reflect the “secondary” purposes may have been  
essential to the adoption of the statute. We draw this distinction not  
because there is any magic to the characterization of primary and  
secondary purposes, but rather to underscore the basic point that the 
sovereign interests of the states are entitled to respect, and one way in 
which that respect is manifested is in the consistent application of a 
strong presumption against preemption. Accordingly, the courts 
should require the party arguing that the federal statute in question 
has preemptive effect to provide a strong showing that the availability 
of state judicial remedies would frustrate statutory purposes (whether 
they are labeled “primary” or “secondary”) to such an extent that 
Congress would not have wanted to allow those remedies to remain 
available. 
Assuming a strong presumption against remedial preemption that 
is only overcome by strong evidence that state remedies would  
interfere with the primary objectives or purposes of federal law, the 
question becomes what kinds of primary objectives and purposes state 
remedies would likely obstruct. That is where the collective action 
perspective comes in. 
3. Collective Action and Federal Regulation 
The collective action perspective on federal preemption begins 
with the recognition that federalism is a structural response to  
collective action problems among states. Collective action problems 
arise when individual states have incentives to act in a manner that is 
contrary to the interests of states as a collective, and transaction and 
enforcement costs would prevent an effective agreement among the 
states to act collectively. Typical examples include negative  
externalities, resource pooling, the race to the bottom, uniformity and 
rationalization of standards, and the “NIMBY” phenomenon. In the 
broadest sense, the benefits of collective action in these situations 
produce a public or collective good for all the states.25  
                                                                                                                 
25
 In essence, when collective action produces collective benefits, those benefits are a  
species of public good; thus, individual states have incentives to act as free riders and a  
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The exercise of federal authority is most justified in response to 
collective action problems that provide incentives for states to act in a 
manner that is inconsistent with the interest of the nation as a whole. 
Most federal regulatory legislation responds to one or more collective 
action problems, as reflected in the statutory purposes. In other words,  
federal action is necessary or justified when state regulation is 
unlikely to produce the optimal result, viewed from the perspective of 
the United States as a whole, because the incentives of individual 
states and the interests of the states as a collective run in different 
directions. 
Our approach to preemption issues takes this principle one step 
further, arguing that displacement of state authority is most justified 
when individual states’ regulations are the product of the very  
incentives to act in a manner contrary to the collective interest that 
justified federal action. Of particular significance for remedial  
preemption as a species of ceiling preemption is that displacement of 
state authority is justified primarily when collective action principles 
would suggest that state courts have incentives to “overregulate” in 
ways that interfere with the interests of the nation as a whole. 
C. Federal Purposes, State Incentives, and Ceiling Preemption 
Not all of the collective action problems identified above create 
incentives to overregulate. In this section, we consider which of these 
problems are likely to lead to overregulation by states in a manner 
that might justify ceiling preemption. The focus here is on ceiling 
preemption generally, and not the more specific question of remedial 
preemption. We address the distinctive issues raised by remedial  
preemption in Part II of the Article. 
1. Resource Pooling and the Race to the Bottom 
We will address resource pooling and the race-to-the-bottom  
rationales for federal regulation first, because these two rationales do 
not generally support ceiling preemption. To the extent that these 
purposes do not support ceiling preemption, it follows without further 
inquiry that they would not generally support remedial preemption. 
Resource pooling rests on the idea that collective action by states 
creates economies of scale or other synergies. Common examples 
might include collective bargaining, national defense, or scientific 
                                                                                                                 
 
“prisoners’ dilemma” results. For discussion of that dilemma, see Glicksman & Levy, supra 
note 3, at 597–98. 
 3/17/2009 7:43:12 AM 
2009] ACCESS TO COURTS AND PREEMPTION 13 
research. Federal action is justified because the states individually 
lack the resources or incentives to act effectively in these areas. To 
the extent that federal health and safety regulation rests on resource 
pooling rationales, the concern that necessitates federal action is that 
states will underregulate. Ceiling preemption would not be justified 
because regulation that goes beyond federal action does not derive 
from or create the problem that resource pooling is designed to  
address—insufficient state regulation.26 
Similarly, federal regulation in response to a so-called race to the 
bottom also would not generally support ceiling preemption. The 
concern reflected in a race-to-the-bottom scenario is that states would 
underregulate because of competition with other states for business.27 
There is considerable academic debate over whether a race to the  
bottom should be viewed as a problem, rather than a form of  
beneficial interjurisdictional competition, and the extent to which it 
actually occurs and presents an obstacle to proper state regulation.28 
Regardless of the merits of this debate, to the extent that the race to 
the bottom presents incentives for states to underregulate, federal 
                                                                                                                 
26
 One possible exception to this point might be in the area of international negotiations, 
in which unilateral state action might undermine the bargaining position of the United States. 
See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (holding that Massachusetts 
law designed to pressure Burma/Myanmar to improve human rights practices was preempted by 
federal law delegating authority in this area to the President). The auto industry raised this 
argument, for example, as an objection to state regulations designed to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions that contribute to climate change, on the theory that it would weaken the ability of the 
United States to negotiate concessions on greenhouse gas emission reductions from other  
countries. See, e.g., Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (E.D. 
Cal. 2007) (rejecting argument and granting summary judgment to the state); Green Mountain 
Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 392 (D. Vt. 2007) (rejecting 
argument). See generally Glicksman & Levy, supra note 3, at 618–24 (discussing issue). This 
potential argument in favor of ceiling preemption is generally not at issue in the context of 
remedial preemption and will not be discussed further in this Article.  
27
 See, e.g., Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1937) (reasoning that federal old age 
insurance was justified because “states and local governments are at times reluctant to increase 
so heavily the burden of taxation to be borne by their residents for fear of placing themselves in 
a position of economic disadvantage as compared with neighbors or competitors”); Steward 
Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 588 (1937) (reasoning that federal unemployment 
compensation was necessary because “[m]any [states] held back through alarm lest, in laying 
such a toll upon their industries, they would place themselves in a position of economic 
disadvantage as compared with neighbors or competitors”). 
28
 See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” 
and Is It “To the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing 
Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and 
Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (2001); Richard 
L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341 
(1996); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-
Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992); 
Scott R. Saleska & Kirsten H. Engel, “Facts are Stubborn Things”: An Empirical Reality Check 
in the Theoretical Debate over the Race-to-the-Bottom in State Environmental Standard-Setting, 
8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55 (1998). 
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regulation to combat a race to the bottom would not support ceiling 
preemption to invalidate state regulation that is more protective than 
federal regulation.29 
2. Uniformity and Rationalization of Standards 
A common justification for federal regulation is the need for  
uniformity, particularly as a means of removing obstructions to  
interstate commerce. In economic terms we might conceive of this 
federal purpose as the rationalization of regulatory standards so as to 
reduce transaction costs associated with a national market. The  
benefits of reducing transaction costs and establishing a national  
market may be understood as public goods that individual states may 
tend to undervalue because many of the benefits are experienced 
outside the state. Especially when powerful interests within a state 
benefit from a standard that deviates from that of other states or when 
the transition to new standards imposes significant costs, state policy 
makers may lack incentives to achieve uniformity.30 Even in the 
absence of such difficulties, the achievement by states of uniform 
standards requires that they overcome the transaction costs of 
reaching agreement on those standards.31  
Because state regulation that exceeds national standards is  
incompatible with uniformity and states’ incentives may run counter 
to the national interest in achieving it, a federal purpose of achieving 
uniformity would tend to support ceiling preemption. Nonetheless, it 
is important to emphasize that not all legislative expressions of a  
desire for uniformity reflect a significant purpose of rationalizing 
standards so as to minimize transaction costs. For example,  
proponents of federal legislation to combat a race-to-the-bottom  
problem might extol the value of a uniform federal standard, but the 
focus in such a case may well be the establishment of a uniform floor 
                                                                                                                 
29
 One might conceive of the converse problem (a “race to the top”), in which states  
compete to attract desirable residents and businesses through overregulation. This problem is 
better conceived of as a manifestation of the NIMBY problem, discussed below. See infra notes 
37–38 and accompanying text. 
30
 In Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959), for example, the Court  
invalidated a state law requiring use of contoured mud flaps on trucks as an obstruction of 
interstate commerce because other states required straight mud flaps. It was reported to one of 
the authors by a student that the manufacturer of contoured mud flaps was located in the state. 
Although we were unable to verify this claim, the scenario is plausible and serves to illustrate 
the point that state policy makers may have incentives to benefit local interests at the expense of 
the national interest in reducing the transaction costs of interstate commerce.  
31
 In many instances, however, all states may benefit, and there are examples of states  
voluntarily achieving rationalization of legal standards, most prominently in the case of the 
Uniform Commercial Code. 
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to provide a minimum level of protection.32 In such a case, uniformity 
would not support ceiling preemption because the focus is not on  
reducing transaction costs by rationalizing standards.33 
In addition, the strength of these concerns may differ sharply based 
on the differences between regulation of goods and services that are 
mobile and regulation of fixed sources.34 Consumer products, for  
example, move frequently across state lines, especially if those  
products are used for purposes of transportation. This movement 
makes rationalization of standards relatively more important with 
respect to such goods and services than with respect to goods or  
services that are stationary and fixed, such as a large power plant. 
This is not to say that the need for uniformity would never justify 
ceiling preemption for stationary or fixed goods and services, but 
rather that the case for ceiling preemption is not as intrinsically 
powerful. 
More broadly, uniformity is to some extent inherent in federal 
regulation, and achieving uniformity is likely to appear at least as a 
secondary consideration or justification for virtually any federal  
regulatory law. To avoid the intrusion on state autonomy that would 
result from preemption of a broad swath of state regulation, the  
purpose of promoting uniformity to rationalize standards and thereby 
reduce transaction costs for regulated entities should be a clear,  
primary purpose of the federal law before it justifies preemption of 
state law. 
                                                                                                                 
32
 See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (2006) (enunciating goal in the Surface Mining Control 
and Reclamation Act to “establish a nationwide program to protect society and the environment 
from the adverse effects of surface coal mining operations”); Pa. Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs, 
Inc. v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 327 (3d Cir. 2002) (describing the goal of that statute as being “to 
establish a ‘nationwide’ program of minimum standards for protecting health, safety, and the 
environment”); Envtl. Encapsulating Corp. v. City of New York, 855 F.2d 48, 59 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(rejecting argument that the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678, 
preempted local regulations requiring training and certification of asbestos removal worker 
because “[t]he statute’s purpose was to assure minimum—but not necessarily uniform—
occupational health and safety standards”). As Tom McGarity has explained, regulatory 
standards are usually designed to provide minimum, across-the-board standards applicable to all 
regulated entities, rather than representing the expert agency’s judgment that its standard  
represents the optimal protective action that should apply in all situations. MCGARITY, supra 
note 18, at 260–61. 
33
 Cf. MCGARITY, supra note 18, at 266 (arguing that federal health and safety standards 
based on what is feasible or what is necessary to provide a certain minimum level of protection 
do not conflict with remedies for state common law causes of action that require defendants “to 
rise above the minimum when a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would do so”). 
34
 See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 3, at 627–36 (discussing distinction between  
pollution from mobile and stationary pollution sources in terms of the need for uniformity). 
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3. Externalities 
One important justification for regulation at the federal level is that 
activity within one state produces externalities that affect other states. 
This sort of externality may be negative, in the sense that the state 
exports burdens to other states (through unregulated activity or 
through regulation itself), or positive, in the sense that the state 
exports benefits (in the form of reduced negative externalities as a 
result of the state’s self-regulation or in the form of economic benefits 
resulting from the failure to regulate activities that produce harms 
within the state). The externalization of burdens or benefits means 
that an individual state’s incentives will not align with the interest of 
the states as a whole. 
If there is a negative externality and the burdens of an activity are 
exported, then we might expect the state of origin to tolerate or  
promote too much of that activity (viewed from the vantage point of 
the collective). If the concern is private activity that causes harm in 
other states, such as pollution or the production of dangerous  
products, then the state in which the activity occurs has an incentive 
to underregulate. When dealing with products sold nationwide, for 
example, states in which the products are produced may have  
incentives to underregulate because the undesirable health and safety 
impacts of those products are borne primarily by those in other states, 
while the economic benefits of the activity are concentrated  
internally. This sort of concern would justify federal regulation to 
establish minimum standards (i.e., floor preemption), but would not 
ordinarily justify preemption of higher state standards. 
In some circumstances, however, the negative externality may be a 
regulatory burden.35 When the regulatory burden of state law is  
exported to other states or to actors in other states, then the state  
exporting the burden has an incentive to overregulate. States in which 
products are sold, but not manufactured, may have incentives to  
require such products to meet stringent health and safety standards, 
insofar as the regulatory burdens will be felt primarily in other,  
manufacturing states. Thus, federal action might be justified to  
prevent overregulation, and this action might support ceiling  
                                                                                                                 
35
 This issue frequently arises under the so-called dormant Commerce Clause, in which 
the Court has expressed concerns about the export of regulatory burdens. See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. 
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 n.2 (1945) (“[T]he Court has often recognized that to the extent that 
the burden of state regulation falls on interests outside the state, it is unlikely to be alleviated by 
the operation of those political restraints normally exerted when interests within the state are 
affected.”). 
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preemption of state laws that impose higher health and safety  
standards than those reflected in federal law.36  
If the activity in question produces benefits that are exported to 
other states, then we might expect too little of the activity. In some 
respects, this is simply the flip side of a negative externality. For  
example, regulation of pollution-causing activities in a state that  
exports environmental harms produces a positive externality in other 
states. Thus, the state’s incentives might lead to underregulation.  
Federal regulation to combat underregulation resulting from positive 
externalities would not generally support ceiling preemption. 
If, however, an activity within a state produces economic benefits 
that are exported to other states, but causes health and safety burdens 
within the state, then the state may have an incentive to overregulate. 
This is, in essence, the NIMBY problem. Consider, for example, the 
problem of waste disposal and the export of waste disposal services.37 
The environmental, health, and safety costs of waste disposal are  
concentrated locally, while the benefits of having facilities to dispose 
of waste, especially radioactive and hazardous waste, are felt  
nationally. For this reason, a state may have incentives to  
overregulate so as to block the siting of a facility in the state.38 
This discussion suggests two basic conclusions about the  
implications of federal regulation to address externalities. First,  
ceiling preemption is not ordinarily justified if the purpose of federal 
regulation is to prevent the export of health and safety risks to other 
states, because that kind of externality would tend to cause  
underregulation. Second, ceiling preemption may be justified in one 
of two circumstances: (1) when states have incentives to export  
regulatory burdens, or (2) when states have incentives to overregulate 
an activity that exports benefits to other states.  
                                                                                                                 
36
 As we discuss more fully below, state remedies may be different from state regulation 
in several respects that may be relevant to the preemption analysis. See infra Part II. 
37
 See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (holding that ban on 
import of wastes violated the dormant Commerce Clause). Although the Court in City of  
Philadelphia treated the law in question as a ban on imports, a more accurate characterization 
would be that the law banned the export of waste disposal space. Viewed from that perspective, 
it is clear that the law was the product of a NIMBY problem because the benefits of waste 
disposal within New Jersey were felt in other states, but the burden of adverse environmental 
consequences (i.e., increased risks of leakage and contamination or a decline in the amount of 
available open space) was felt in New Jersey. 
38
 This appears to be the rationale behind the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 
1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b–2021d (2000). The 1980 Act was amended in 1986. Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (1986). 
See generally New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149–51 (1992) (discussing the  
operation of low-level radioactive waste facilities and legislation pertaining to them). 
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4. General Framework 
The analysis to this point suggests a general framework for  
analyzing the kinds of federal regulatory purposes that might support 
ceiling preemption of state health and safety regulations. These  
purposes are relevant to all three kinds of preemption under standard 
preemption doctrine. They are relevant to the congressional decision 
whether to expressly preempt (or save) state authority to regulate and 
in interpreting the scope of any express preemption provision (or  
savings clause). They are relevant to the determination of whether 
federal law has occupied the field, which is determined under current 
doctrine by assessing whether the purpose of the federal law requires 
occupation of the field and whether there is a dominant federal  
interest. They are also relevant to the scope of an occupied field.  
Finally, they are relevant in determining whether conflict preemption 
has occurred, which depends on whether enforcement of the state law 
would obstruct the object and purpose of the federal law. 
Our approach focuses on the collective action problems among 
states that justify regulation at the federal level to analyze whether the 
purposes of federal regulation support preemption of state judicial 
remedies. From this perspective, it appears that resource pooling and 
combating a race to the bottom do not generally support ceiling 
preemption, while the rationalization of regulatory standards  
(uniformity), overcoming the externalization of regulatory burdens, 
and responding to a NIMBY problem might.  
We say “might” because the presence of one or more of these  
purposes is not sufficient, in and of itself, to support preemption. The 
states are sovereign entities with the authority and responsibility to 
exercise the police power to protect the health, safety, and welfare of 
their citizens. In light of the constitutional weight afforded this  
authority,39 the presumption against preemption requires that ceiling 
preemption be explicit, or that statutory purposes that justify implied 
ceiling preemption be sufficiently clear and important to warrant the 
displacement of state authority. The analysis of these questions will 
necessarily depend on the specifics of the federal statute involved. 
Even if ceiling preemption of state regulation is justified,  
moreover, it does not inevitably follow that state judicial remedies 
                                                                                                                 
39
 This weight is perhaps reflected in the practice of the Supreme Court of referring to 
“Our Federalism” using capital letters, beginning in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). 
Although the Court had used the term at least as far back as 1939, see Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 
398, 428 (1939), it apparently did not merit capitalization until Younger. Recent decisions use 
both the upper case and lower case versions of the term. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 
706, 748 (1999) (lower case); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 587 (1999) 
(upper case). 
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should be preempted. In the next part of the Article, we consider the 
differences between state remedies and other forms of state law and 
what those differences imply for application of ceiling preemption to 
state judicial remedies. 
II. CEILING PREEMPTION AND STATE REMEDIES 
Assuming that a sufficiently clear and important federal purpose 
supports ceiling preemption, the question remains whether the  
displaced state regulatory authority encompasses state judicial  
remedies. We believe that there are important differences between 
state judicial remedies and other forms of state regulation that warrant 
special consideration when analyzing remedial preemption issues. 
These include the differences between legislatures and courts as  
policymaking bodies, the differences between legislative rules40 and 
judicial remedies as instruments of policy, and the possibility of  
accommodating federal regulation within the remedial structure of 
state law. All of these differences generally support affording federal 
law less preemptive effect on judicial remedies than on legislative 
rules. 
A. Courts vs. Legislatures 
The prior discussion of the incentives of states did not consider the 
nature of the institutional processes through which those incentives 
affect the expression of policy preferences as law.41 Yet the process 
through which positive state regulation is adopted differs in important 
respects from the process through which courts provide remedies, and 
these differences affect the extent to which we might expect the law 
to reflect the narrow self-interests of the state. In particular, the  
enactment of laws by a politically accountable legislature (and  
implementation by politically accountable agencies) is substantially 
more likely to be affected by problematic incentives than are judicial 
decisions regarding remedies. 
                                                                                                                 
40
 We use this term to include both statutes enacted by state legislatures and binding  
regulations issued by state agencies. 
41
 Incentives issues are particularly salient for burden export and NIMBY problems, 
which are essentially problems of state incentives. The ways in which state incentives may 
undervalue rationalization of standards so that transaction costs are reduced are less obvious. In 
any event, inquiry into those incentives may be less important when there is a primary federal 
purpose of rationalizing standards, insofar as any state standards that deviate from the federal 
norm interfere with the purpose of achieving uniformity, even if they are the product of  
historical accident or other factors. 
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1. Political Accountability and Legislative Incentives 
Notwithstanding public choice and related criticisms of the  
political process, the essential feature of legislatures is their political 
accountability. The law assumes, because of this accountability, that 
legislators will enact laws that reflect the interests of the state; i.e., 
enact laws that are pleasing to (and oppose laws that are not pleasing 
to) their political constituencies.42 Thus, the political process tends to 
align legislation with the interests of constituents, which for state  
legislators means interests within the state. While state administrative 
agencies are less directly politically accountable, some state  
administrators may be elected and most others are appointed and  
removed by the governor, also a political actor.  
Consider, for example, the problem of exporting a regulatory  
burden. This phenomenon is problematic because the out-of-state 
parties that bear the burden lack political input and are not part of the 
constituency to whom the legislators answer.43 The citizens of the 
state, on the other hand, gain the benefits of improved health and 
safety or environmental quality that result. From the perspective of a 
legislator, such regulations would be desirable because there is a 
chance to gain political favor with in-state constituencies without any 
loss of political support from other in-state constituencies. The 
assumption that state legislatures are likely to favor in-state interests 
is widespread and lies at the foundations of various constitutional 
provisions and doctrines or statutory schemes.44 
2. Judicial Independence and Incentives 
In contrast to legislators, courts, as an institution, are generally 
more insulated from and independent of the political process. While 
the independence of federal judges is protected by the appointment  
process, life tenure, and salary protections,45 state judges typically 
                                                                                                                 
42
 There is disagreement, of course, about the elements of their constituency to which  
legislators respond—average voters, members of their party, major contributors, or some other 
subset. 
43
 Under some views of the legislative process, however, legislators might respond to out-
of-state interests that make substantial political contributions. 
44
 See supra note 35 (citing example of this reasoning under the dormant Commerce 
Clause). 
45
 Even with these protections, empirical evidence suggests that political affiliations of 
federal judges affect their decisionmaking. See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do 
Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 
823 (2006); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 
VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, 
Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 
301 (2004); cf. Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623 
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have fewer safeguards of independence. For example, many state 
judges face potentially contested elections (either partisan or  
nonpartisan), and a majority stand periodically for retention.46  
Notwithstanding relatively greater political accountability of state 
judges as compared to federal judges, a variety of factors suggest that 
political considerations are much less significant for judicial decisions 
than for legislative votes.47 
For those judges that do stand for election, the role of political 
pressure on policy issues tends to be more muted than in legislative 
elections. Retention elections, for example, are uncontested, and 
judges seldom are expelled on the basis of their decisions, although it 
does happen from time to time for particularly high-profile and 
unpopular decisions.48 Contested elections are often nonpartisan, and 
even partisan elections are less likely to be hotly contested than their  
legislative counterparts or to attract active public interest, even if 
there is a trend toward increasing politicization of judicial elections.49 
                                                                                                                 
 
(2009) (discussing impact of judicial elections in locations dominated by one political party on 
judicial decisions). 
46
 For a comprehensive compilation of state judicial selection methods, see  
AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: APPELLATE AND  
GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS (2007), available at http://www.ajs.org/selection/ 
docs/Judicial%20Selection%20Charts.pdf [hereinafter JUDICIAL SELECTION]; see also Stephen 
J. Ware, Selection to the Kansas Supreme Court, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 386, 387–94 
(2008) (providing an overview of state methods for selecting state supreme court justices with a 
focus on the role of the bar). According to JUDICIAL SELECTION, nine states select trial judges of 
general jurisdiction by partisan election, six select intermediate appellate judges by partisan 
election, and eight select judges of the court of last resort by partisan election. JUDICIAL 
SELECTION, supra, at 4–6. A much larger number use merit selection: seventeen states use merit 
selection for trial courts, eighteen for courts of appeal, and twenty-five (half) for the court of last 
resort. Id. Even in states with merit selection, nonpartisan retention elections are common. Id. 
47
 Our colleague Steve Ware has argued, however, that current judicial selection methods 
in some states make them overly accountable to the bar as a special interest. See Ware, supra 
note 46, at 394–409 (advocating changes to the selection process in Kansas to reduce the 
influence of the bar). The implications of this argument for preemption analysis are unclear, 
because the influence of the bar may tend to favor either plaintiffs or defendants, although it 
might be argued that both the plaintiff and defendant bars have incentives to increase the 
amount of litigation, which would tend to favor more judicial remedies. 
48
 See, e.g., Brett Christopher Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical Comparison of State 
and Lower Federal Court Interpretations of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 23 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 233, 248 (1999) (referring to “the rare but high profile incidents of 
judges being rejected by an electorate”); Robert S. Thompson, Judicial Retention Elections and 
Judicial Method: A Retrospective on the California Retention Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 2007 (1988) (discussing the 1986 California election in which Chief Justice Rose Byrd of 
the California Supreme Court was ousted in a retention election). 
49
 See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless Judicial Selection Debate and Why It Matters 
for Judicial Independence, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1263–69 (2008) (discussing various 
developments that contribute to increased politicization of judicial elections). 
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While critics may argue with some force that judicial elections 
compromise judicial independence,50 other factors tend to diminish 
the extent to which even elected judges are likely to decide cases in  
accordance with the perceived interests of their constituents. The  
nature of the judicial office limits the extent to which judges  
campaign on the basis of their decisions. While Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White51 held that the First Amendment protects judges’ 
ability to conduct election campaigns, the extent to which judges can 
and do campaign on the basis of how they would decide cases 
remains limited by both tradition and ethical canons.52 Conversely, 
research suggests that the public is less attentive to judicial 
elections.53 If so, then judges would tend to be less concerned that 
they will be punished politically for their decisions—except that the 
public may of course react to controversial, high-profile decisions. 
More fundamentally, judges remain accountable to the law in other 
ways, particularly through precedent and the potential for appeal. 
While a legislator is free to vote in accordance with his or her views 
of public policy or the interests of constituents, judges are not. By 
training and inclination, they use the legal method, which places  
emphasis on precedent, even if there are means of avoiding or  
overruling it. For lower courts, the possibility of being reversed on 
appeal is a significant check on the judge’s ability to decide a case in 
accordance with his or her views of the preferences of constituents, 
and even state supreme court justices may have to be concerned about 
the possibility of reversal by the United States Supreme Court.54 It is 
also worth noting that, to the extent litigation of state remedies 
satisfies the requirements of diversity of citizenship, the case can be 
removed to federal court.55 
                                                                                                                 
50
 For an extreme example, see Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252 
(2009) (holding that due process requires recusal of elected judge from case involving litigant 
who spent millions of dollars in support of his election). 
51
 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
52
 For example, canons prohibiting judges from committing to decide a case in a particular 
way have been upheld. E.g., Pa. Family Inst., Inc. v. Celluci, 521 F. Supp. 2d 351 (E.D. Pa. 
2007); Fla. Family Policy Council v. Freeman, No. 4:06cv00395 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2007) 
(order of dismissal). 
53
 See Geyh, supra note 49, at 1270–72 (discussing data suggesting substantial “roll off” 
from voters who vote in executive and legislative races but not judicial elections and whether 
increasingly hotly contested elections will change that tendency). 
54
 Cf. Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process, 51 SMU L. 
REV. 469 (1998) (concluding that the possibility of being reversed on appeal affects the  
incentives of trial judges). 
55
 Of course, under the Erie doctrine the federal court would apply the forum state’s law, 
which means that diversity jurisdiction responds only to the potential that forum state interests 
would affect the particular case, and not the potential problem that the forum state’s law itself 
reflects improper state incentives. 
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All this is not to say that state judges are immune from  
consideration of their state’s interests when deciding cases.56 Indeed, 
as Justice Story famously proclaimed, “[t]he constitution has  
presumed (whether rightly or wrongly we do not inquire) that state 
attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests, 
might sometimes obstruct, or control, or be supposed to obstruct or 
control, the regular administration of justice.”57 Diversity jurisdiction, 
after all, is based on the fear that state courts and juries will treat  
out-of-state parties unfairly.58 The difference in the nature of political 
accountability of legislatures and judges nevertheless suggests that 
courts should not assume that congressional concern about improper 
state regulatory incentives necessarily extends to judicial decisions. 
The same difference also suggests that the evidence to justify 
remedial preemption should reflect specific concern for judicial 
incentives, not merely general concern for state incentives.59 
These issues are illustrated by International Paper Co. v. 
Ouellette,60 which held that, while the federal Clean Water Act 
preempted a claim under the nuisance law of the state in which the 
pollution damage occurred, it did not preempt a suit based on the 
common law of the source state.61 In terms of our framework, the 
displacement of the downstream state’s nuisance remedies would 
only make sense if the Clean Water Act reflected significant federal 
                                                                                                                 
56
 For example, Richard E. Neely, a former West Virginia Supreme Court Justice, wrote:  
As long as I am allowed to redistribute wealth from out-of-state companies to injured 
in-state plaintiffs, I shall continue to do so. Not only is my sleep enhanced when I 
give someone else’s money away, but so is my job security, because the in-state 
plaintiffs, their families, and their friends will reelect me.  
RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS: HOW BUSINESS CAN BE RESCUED FROM THE 
POLITICS OF STATE COURTS 4 (1988). Neely advocates an expanded role for federal common 
law as a solution to the problem of unreasonable products liability judgments. See id. at 28–29.  
57
 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816). 
58
 See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, The Uneasy Case for Transjurisdictional Adjudication, 
94 VA. L. REV. 1869, 1872 (2008) (“[T]he constitutional inclusion and the continued 
congressional authorization of federal diversity jurisdiction suggest . . . that state courts’  
susceptibility to bias against out-of-state parties renders them less able than federal courts to 
resolve state law questions ‘correctly.’”). 
59
 This analysis would not apply to remedies created by state statute, however, because 
statutory remedies are enacted by politically accountable legislators rather than adopted by 
judicial decision. 
60
 479 U.S. 481 (1987). 
61
 The Court in Ouellette reasoned that “the application of Vermont law against  
[International Paper] would allow [the plaintiffs] to circumvent the [Act’s] permit system, 
thereby upsetting the balance of public and private interests so carefully addressed by the Act.” 
Id. at 494. It also found that allowing tort actions to be brought under the common law of the 
affected state would allow “Vermont and other States [to] do indirectly what they could not do 
directly—regulate the conduct of out-of-state sources.” Id. at 495. Finally, the Court determined 
that “[a]pplication of an affected State’s law to an out-of-state source also would undermine the 
important goals of efficiency and predictability in the permit system.” Id. at 496. 
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concerns that judges in downstream states would have incentives to 
export regulatory burdens to upstream states.62 At the same time, 
however, the Court rejected the defendant paper company’s argument 
that any parties injured by water pollution should be required to sue in 
the courts of the source state, as well as rely on source state common 
law.63 Thus, the paper company apparently believed that the courts of 
its home state would treat it more favorably both in terms of the  
applicable nuisance law (which the Supreme Court accepted) and in 
terms of the application of that law (which the Supreme Court  
rejected).  
B. Legislative Rules vs. Judicial Decisions  
Another important difference between ordinary ceiling preemption 
and remedial preemption is the difference between the purpose and 
effect of legislative rules and of judicial remedies. The purposes of 
legislative rules and judicial remedies differ in that most legislative 
rules focus primarily on controlling the conduct of the regulated  
entity, while judicial remedies also are designed to compensate or 
otherwise provide relief for a party who has suffered harm.64 In terms 
                                                                                                                 
62
 Insofar as the Court interpreted the statute as permitting only source states to impose 
stricter regulation of discharges into their waters, see id. at 499 (“Because the Act specifically 
allows source States to impose stricter standards, the imposition of source-state law does not 
disrupt the regulatory partnership established by the permit system.”), the statute would appear 
to reflect concern about the export of regulatory burdens by downstream states. While this 
interpretation of the Clean Water Act is debatable, see Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, 
Judicial Activism and Restraint in the Supreme Court’s Environmental Law Decisions, 42 
VAND. L. REV. 343, 403 (1989), if accurate it would justify ceiling preemption of regulation by 
downstream states. It does not follow from this conclusion, however, that downstream state 
nuisance remedies should also be preempted, unless the statute also reflected equal concern that 
judges would have similar incentives to export burdens to upstream states. Insofar as the statute 
contains an express savings clause for judicial remedies that is broadly worded and does not 
distinguish between upstream and downstream states, see 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (2006), the case 
for preempting state judicial remedies is weaker. 
63
 The Court concluded that “application of the source State’s law does not disturb the 
balance among federal, source-state, and affected-state interests,” Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 498–99, 
and added that “the restriction of suits to those brought under source-state nuisance law prevents 
a source from being subject to an indeterminate number of potential regulations.” Id. at 499. 
64
 Alexandra Klass distinguishes between those tort laws intended to serve as a branch of 
public regulatory law by deterring undesirable conduct, compensating victims of wrongdoing, 
and spreading undesirable losses, and those tort laws designed to provide citizens with the right 
to redress private wrongs, thereby setting standards for individual rights and responsibilities and 
assuring citizens that the government will provide them with a judicial means of redress based 
on individual circumstances. She contends that the public law component of tort law should be 
protected from federal interference under federalism principles, including the presumption 
against preemption. The private law aspects of tort law should be protected not only by  
federalism principles, but also by principles of due process. Alexandra B. Klass, Tort  
Experiments in the Laboratories of Democracy, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1501 (2009). For 
discussion of potential takings issues arising from preemption of state judicial remedies, see 
infra note 72 and accompanying text. Cf. MCGARITY, supra note 18, at 31–34 (describing the 
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of effects, legislative rules have a more direct and significant impact 
on a class of regulated entities than do judicial decisions, which 
directly bind only the parties and may be distinguished in later 
decisions. 
Both the purposes and effects of state law are relevant to analysis 
of the preemptive effect of federal law, but they are relevant to  
different aspects of that analysis. The purposes of state law are  
relevant because they reflect the weight of the state’s interest in the 
preservation of its laws. As we indicate below, states have a strong 
interest in the preservation of state judicial remedies that provide 
compensation for those injured by the activities of others, particularly 
if the federal regulatory program creates no substitute for the 
preempted state compensatory remedies. In this “corrective justice” 
context, the strength of the state’s interest would support the 
application of a very strong presumption against preemption.65 The 
effects of state laws are relevant to whether those laws conflict with 
the purposes of federal law in such a way as to warrant preemption. A 
legitimate set of state purposes should not save from preemption a 
law that impermissibly interferes with the accomplishment of federal 
goals. Conversely, a state law prompted by concerns that Congress 
would not have regarded as legitimate should not support preemption 
if the operation of that law does not impair federal goals. 
1. The Purposes of Judicial Remedies 
As noted above, while the primary purpose of legislative rules is 
typically to affect the conduct of regulated parties, judicial remedies, 
particularly tort remedies, have an important compensatory 
function.66 It may be true, as proponents of law and economics argue, 
                                                                                                                 
 
shift in emphasis over time between the corrective justice and protective justice functions of tort 
law). 
65
 See MCGARITY, supra note 18, at 31 (defining corrective justice as “the correction of 
unjust changes in wealth that result from interactions among the members of a polity” and 
describing its function as “‘redress[ing] unjust gains and losses by means of a financial 
adjustment’” (quoting Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic 
Justification for Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2355 (1990))); WILLIAM FUNK ET 
AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, THE TRUTH ABOUT TORTS: REGULATORY PREEMPTION 
AT THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION 10 (2008), available at 
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/NHTSA_Preemption_804.pdf (“When people are 
injured despite manufacturer compliance with existing safety standards, the corrective justice 
function of state tort law ensures that those injured are properly compensated in light of the 
evolving state of technology and new information available to the manufacturer.”). See 
generally Wells, supra (comparing distributive and corrective justice and exploring the 
justifications for the corrective justice function of tort law). 
66
 Of course, state statutes may create remedies as well. Thus, these arguments would also 
apply to the preemption of statutory remedies. 
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that common law tort rules have a deterrent effect and are consistent 
with a policy designed to promote efficient behavior,67 but that should 
not cause courts to lose sight of the fact that the primary goal of tort 
law is compensation.68 State constitutions do not enshrine the right to 
a “remedy by due course of law” because of a desire to efficiently  
regulate conduct,69 but rather because widespread conceptions of 
justice require compensation when a person suffers injury from the 
wrongful conduct of another. 
Unlike the preemption of state legislative rules, the preemption of 
state judicial remedies displaces not only their regulatory (or police 
power) component, but also their compensatory role. This point is 
particularly significant when the federal law in question does not  
provide a remedy.70 When such a federal law displaces a state  
legislative rule, the regulatory component of the state law is replaced 
by the regulatory component of the federal law. In contrast, unless the 
federal law also creates a remedy for injured persons, remedial  
preemption would not replace the compensatory component of the 
displaced state remedies. In light of the importance attached to  
judicial remedies by states and their citizens, we believe that courts 
should be especially reluctant to find remedial preemption when the 
federal law in question does not provide a substitute remedy of some 
kind.71 Indeed, the elimination of all state compensatory remedies 
                                                                                                                 
67
 See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987) (discussing the application of economic efficiency theory to 
the common law). Many different kinds of state actions have incidental regulatory effects, 
including state tax laws. Unless courts construe federal statutory provisions preempting state 
“requirements” or “standards” to be confined to state laws whose primary function is to regulate 
private conduct, such provisions might invalidate state tax laws, even though they may be  
designed primarily to enhance state revenues. 
68
 Thus, for example, in Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009), the Court reasoned that 
Congress declined to provide a remedy for consumers injured by misbranded drugs because it 
relied on state remedies to perform that compensatory function. Id. at 1199. The Court then 
observed that Congress “may also have recognized that state-law remedies further consumer 
protection by motivating manufacturers to produce safe and effective drugs and to give adequate 
warnings.” Id. at 1199–1200. 
69
 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
70
 See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1199 (“Congress did not provide a federal remedy for 
consumers harmed by unsafe or ineffective drugs in the 1938 statute or in any subsequent 
amendment.”). 
71
 This analysis underscores the point we made earlier concerning the Supreme Court’s 
apparently greater willingness to find implied preemption than to find an implied right of action. 
See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text; see also MCGARITY, supra note 18, at 33  
(“[I]nsofar as the federal government’s regulatory standards preempt state common law 
remedies without providing an alternative compensation regime, preemption completely 
eliminates the corrective justice role that common law courts have played in this country since 
its founding.”). Professor McGarity adds that, in interpreting the scope of express preemption 
clauses or determining the scope of implied preemption, “[t]he loss of corrective justice will 
probably play strongly . . . , along with the general virtues of federalism and the back-stop 
function of the common law.” Id. at 245. 
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without the creation of a federal substitute may raise due process or 
takings concerns.72 
2. The Regulatory Effects of Judicial Remedies 
Of course, state law is preempted, regardless of its purposes, if the 
effect of the state law is to impede the operation of the federal law. 
Thus, the purposes of state judicial remedies cannot save them from 
preemption if their effects place them within the scope of an express 
preemption provision or interfere with federal purposes that support 
preemption. While judicial remedies do have regulatory effects,  
however, those effects are less direct and immediate than those  
resulting from other forms of state regulation. As a result, those 
remedies are less likely to interfere with the federal regulatory  
objectives. Put differently, a federal purpose (and statutory language) 
that supports ceiling preemption of state regulation does not  
necessarily support preemption of state remedies.73 
Regulation in the form of legislative rules creates directly binding 
obligations that apply across-the-board to all regulated entities. These 
rules are typically enforced by means of executive or administrative 
action and are subject to criminal or civil sanctions. Thus, while  
regulatory violations can and do occur, including intentional  
violations, it is normal and expected that regulated entities will take 
immediate action to comply with legislative rules. To the extent that 
the state’s regulation through legislative rules is inconsistent with the 
purposes of federal regulation, the impairment of the federal purpose 
from the regulation is likely great. 
By way of contrast, judicial remedies are individual decisions 
whose regulatory effects result from their precedential value. A  
judicial decision is therefore less likely to have a direct, across-the-
board regulatory impact on affected entities.74 To be sure, companies 
                                                                                                                 
72
 See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Private Legal Remedies for 
Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 121, 179–85 (1985); cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 
(1976) (stating that among the “historic liberties” preserved from deprivation without due 
process is a right “to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on personal security” (citing 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923))); Richards v. Wash. Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 
553 (1914) (“[W]hile the legislature may legalize what otherwise would be a public nuisance, it 
may not confer immunity from action for a private nuisance of such a character as to amount . . . 
to a taking of private property for public use.”); Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 
309 (Iowa 1998) (holding that state law barring nuisance actions against farmers who burn their 
crops amounted to the taking of an easement over neighboring properties). But cf. Johnson v. 
Am. Leather Specialties Corp., 578 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1172–76 (N.D. Iowa 2008) (holding that 
state statute creating immunity from tort liability did not amount to a compensable taking). 
73
 See supra note 18 (arguing that the use of terms such as “standards” or “requirements” 
in express preemption provisions does not necessarily include state judicial remedies).  
74
 Cf. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1194 (quoting with approval the Vermont Supreme Court’s 
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pay attention to litigation and the results, especially when they or 
others like them are held liable (or forced to defend multiple suits) or 
when damages are very large, but they do not necessarily alter their 
conduct on the basis of a few successful lawsuits, since other suits 
may be unsuccessful. An important factor in this regard is the  
availability of insurance, which reduces the impact of successful  
lawsuits, but cannot be used to soften the blow of enforcement of 
legislative rules.75  
To illustrate the differences between legislative rules and judicial 
remedies for purposes of preemption analysis, consider the purpose of 
rationalizing standards to reduce the transactions costs of interstate 
distribution of goods and services. The collective action problem to 
which federal preemption responds is that states may undervalue the 
benefits of reducing transaction costs for businesses marketing their 
products or services nationally, or that transaction costs may prevent 
voluntary alignment of laws.76 If states have conflicting and  
inconsistent legislative rules governing the design or marketing of a 
product, then companies have little choice but to adapt the design and 
sales of that product to the requirements of each state or forego  
marketing and selling the product in some states.77  
The question in deciding whether to preempt state judicial  
remedies, or to construe ambiguous federal legislation to have that 
effect, is whether retention of state judicial remedies creates the same 
threat of increased transaction costs and obstacles to national product 
marketing that a lack of uniformity in positive regulation does. In 
light of the strong presumption against preemption of state judicial 
remedies and the limited regulatory effects of judicial remedies, we 
argue that a federal purpose of achieving regulatory uniformity will 
not always justify preemption of state judicial remedies.78 The  
                                                                                                                 
 
observation that the jury verdict in the case did not “mandate a particular replacement 
warning”). 
75
 Ironically, the “moral hazard” problem that is often seen as a negative effect of  
insurance coverage may be a positive reason to avoid remedial preemption. 
76
 See supra Part I.C.2. 
77
 Alternatively, if state standards are performance standards rather than design standards, 
companies may choose to comply with the most stringent state’s standards and market uniform 
products nationally. This result would allow the state with the highest performance standards to 
dictate the national standard, increasing the costs for companies and potentially exporting  
regulatory burdens to other states. Another option for regulated entities is to violate legislative 
rules and treat any resulting monetary penalties as a cost of doing business. Criminal fines may 
be excluded from insurance coverage, however. See Andrew L. Kolesar & Jacqueline M. 
Kovilaritch, Buying and Selling Brownfield Properties: A Practical Guide for Successful  
Transactions, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 467, 474 (2000). 
78
 The analysis here does not extend to legislation that reflects Congress’s decision to 
strike a particular balance between protecting public health and safety and limiting the burdens 
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existence of potential tort liability in different states, unlike the  
applicability of multiple state regulatory standards, is likely to be 
viewed as a cost of doing business.79 That cost may be addressed by 
responses other than changing the design or marketing of the product, 
including insurance coverage, price increases, or contractual  
responses. The interference with the goal of reducing transaction 
costs is less severe than the one resulting from standards imposed by 
legislative rules. 
C. Extent of Remedial Preemption 
Even assuming that the language and purposes of federal law  
provide sufficiently clear evidence to overcome the presumption 
against remedial preemption, the complete displacement of state  
remedial authority will seldom be necessary to accommodate the  
federal interest, and would be especially inappropriate when the  
federal law provides no substitute remedy. Instead, there are likely to 
be ways for state remedial law to avoid incompatibility with the  
federal law. 
1. Using the Federal Standard 
One way to reconcile state remedies and federal law is to conform 
the state remedial law to federal requirements or standards. There are 
two obvious ways to do this. The first is to treat compliance with  
federal law as a defense to a state tort action, to the extent that the 
                                                                                                                 
 
that regulation imposes on product manufacturers and service providers. If Congress decides 
that a particular balance is optimal, and that any deviation from that balance would interfere 
with the federal purposes reflected in settling on that optimal balance, then it might make sense 
to preempt state tort judgments against a business in full compliance with federal standards. 
Preemption in this context, however, is based on an effort to prevent states from exporting 
regulatory burdens, rather than a desire to reduce transaction costs. In other words, preemption 
is justified as a mechanism to prevent the export of externalities resulting from overregulation 
by states of businesses located elsewhere, rather than from a desire to achieve uniform levels of 
regulation to reduce transaction costs. Note, however, that Congress may seek to strike a  
balance in adopting federal regulatory standards without also having a purpose to prevent states 
from striking a different balance. Displacement of state authority is only justified when the 
legislative purpose is to strike a single nationwide balance and to prevent disruption of that 
balance from overregulation. 
79
 Imagine, for example, a fast food chain being held liable in tort for injuries resulting 
from a spill of scalding-hot coffee. See Greene v. Boddie-Noell Enters., Inc., 966 F. Supp. 416, 
418 n.1 (W.D. Va. 1997) (noting a state court jury in Albuquerque, New Mexico that awarded a 
woman compensatory damages and punitive damages after she was burned by coffee purchased 
from a drive-through window at a McDonalds restaurant, but dismissing case involving similar 
incident). The fast food chain will not relish the prospect of defending such suits, but the  
possibility that it will have to do so is not likely to disrupt its efforts to market its coffee 
throughout the nation, given readily available options such as lowering the temperature of the 
coffee or purchasing insurance to protect it against damage awards. 
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lawsuit alleges conduct that falls within the scope of the federal  
regulatory regime. The second is to treat the federal law as  
establishing the standard by which the liability of the defendant is to 
be judged, essentially allowing the state to provide compensation for 
persons injured as a result of a violation of federal law.80 The  
essential difference between these two approaches is the burden of 
proof. If treated as a defense, the burden would be on the defendant to 
establish compliance with federal law, while treating federal law as 
the applicable standard would require the plaintiff to establish a  
violation. 
Absent unusual circumstances, it is hard to see how either 
approach would compromise federal interests, since the federal 
standard is retained. Providing compensation to plaintiffs able to 
prove that the defendant violated federal law might have a general 
deterrent effect on regulated entities in the state providing 
compensation. Such a deterrent, however, would not interfere with 
the rationalization of standards, since the remedial standard would be 
the same as the uniform federal standard (just as it would be under the 
approach that allows compliance to serve as a defense to a state 
common law tort action). Likewise, since the state remedies 
incorporate federal standards, those standards are not distorted under 
either approach by burden exports or NIMBY problems. In some 
cases, there could be concerns that the application of the federal 
standard might be affected by distorted incentives (even to the point 
of jury nullification).81 Similarly, state courts might interpret and 
apply federal standards differently so as to undermine uniformity and 
increase transaction costs. These problems, however, are surely less 
severe and commonplace than the comparable problems caused by 
differing state judge-made liability standards (which are in turn less 
severe than those caused by state legislative rules). 
Conversely, incorporation of the federal standard would allow the 
states, at least to some degree, to further the compensatory purposes 
of judicial remedies. It would still prevent states from protecting their 
citizens by providing a judicial forum for compensating them for 
injuries caused by conduct that complies with federal standards that 
the state might consider to be insufficiently protective. This concern 
cautions against too readily concluding that federal laws preempt state 
remedies in the sense of establishing a defense or the standard of 
                                                                                                                 
80
 See State ex rel. Stenehjem v. FreeEats.com, Inc., 712 N.W.2d 828 (N.D. 2006)  
(involving a state remedy for alleged violations of Federal Telecommunications Act). 
81
 A jury might find for a local plaintiff and against an out-of-state company  
notwithstanding compliance with the federal standard. Such a result could be difficult to detect 
if there is a general verdict. 
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liability. But if remedial preemption is called for, either approach 
preserves some access to court for injured individuals, and allows the 
states to protect their citizens, at least to some extent. 
2. Alternative Theories 
A related point is that even if preemption of some state remedies is 
called for, other theories of liability may be consistent with federal 
law. In other words, careful attention should be paid to whether the 
theory of a given case would establish de facto regulatory standards 
that would undermine the purposes of the federal statute or regulation 
in question. Given the important state interests in compensating  
injured citizens through judicial remedies, the scope of remedial  
preemption should be no greater than necessary to protect the federal 
purposes. 
To illustrate this point, consider the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,82 which in many ways launched 
the current debate over remedial preemption. The Supreme Court held 
that a federal regulation giving automobile manufacturers the choice 
of providing passive seatbelts or airbags preempted a products  
liability lawsuit alleging that providing seatbelts but not airbags  
constituted a design defect.83 This result makes some sense in terms 
of our framework, because there are powerful reasons for 
rationalizing standards for the design of automobiles to reduce 
transaction costs.84 Further, courts in states that do not manufacture 
automobiles may have an incentive to overregulate because the 
burden is exported to other states in which the manufacture took 
place. 
Even if products liability cases based on this theory are preempted, 
however, other theories would not necessarily conflict with federal 
purposes to the same extent, and might be allowed to go forward. The 
courts should analyze each theory of liability to determine whether  
providing relief under that particular theory creates a conflict with 
federal law. Thus, for example, in Carrasquilla v. Mazda Motor 
Corp.,85 a federal district court held that some claims related to 
seatbelts were preempted by federal law under Geier. But it allowed 
claims based on alleged defects in the design of the seat back, seat 
                                                                                                                 
82
 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
83
 Id. at 864 
84
 An even narrower reading of Geier would be that the recognition of liability based on 
the choice to provide passive seatbelts is in direct conflict with the federal regulation permitting 
that choice. 
85
 166 F. Supp. 2d 169 (M.D. Pa. 2001). 
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track, and knee bolster to go forward.86 Claims based on the  
manufacturer’s choice of seatbelts may be inconsistent with a  
regulatory standard providing auto manufacturers with that choice. 
But the federal standard did not address seat back, seat track, or knee 
bolster design, so allowing design defect claims relating to those 
components of the car to proceed did not interfere with operation of 
any federal standard.87  
This kind of analysis has been applied in other areas as well,  
particularly with respect to claims against cigarette manufacturers. 
Thus, for example, courts have determined that failure to warn claims 
are preempted by federal law, but not claims based on theories such 
as misrepresentation or fraud.88 Careful attention to the basis of the 
state law claim helps to ensure that preemption only applies when the 
regulatory effects of the claim are within the scope of any federal 
purposes that support ceiling preemption. Conversely, that attention 
helps to preserve the states’ fundamental interest in providing  
remedies for their citizens when recognition of such remedies does 
not have regulatory effects that are inconsistent with federal purposes. 
III. WYETH V. LEVINE 
In this section, we briefly discuss the Supreme Court’s recent  
decision in Wyeth v. Levine,89 which is consistent with our analysis 
and serves as a useful illustration of several key points we advance 
here. First, the Court (over the objections of dissenters) began with a 
presumption against preemption, emphasizing the traditional role of 
states’ police powers to protect the health and safety of their 
citizens.90 The majority rejected the argument advanced by the  
dissent—correctly in our view—“that the presumption against  
pre-emption should not apply to claims of implied conflict  
pre-emption at all . . . .”91 Later in the opinion, the Court also drew a 
negative inference against legislative intent to preempt state judicial 
                                                                                                                 
86
 Id. at 178-80. 
87
 See id. 
88
 See, e.g., Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008). 
89
 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). 
90
 Id. at 1194–95 (“‘In all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress 
has “legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally occupied,” . . . we “start with the 
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal 
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”’” (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. 
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 
(1947))) (alterations in original)); see also id. at 1195 n.3 (“We rely on the presumption because 
respect for the States as ‘independent sovereigns in our federal system’ leads us to assume that 
‘Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.’” (quoting Medtronic, 518 
U.S. at 485)).  
91
 Id. at 1195 n.3. 
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remedies from Congress’s failure to include an express preemption 
provision.92 
Second, the Court distinguished between floor and ceiling  
preemption, and looked for evidence of congressional intent to  
displace state authority to impose more stringent standards than  
required by Congress: 
Wyeth contends that the FDCA establishes both a floor and a 
ceiling for drug regulation: Once the FDA has approved a 
drug’s label, a state-law verdict may not deem the label  
inadequate, regardless of whether there is any evidence that 
the FDA has considered the stronger warning at issue. The 
most glaring problem with this argument is that all evidence 
of Congress’ purposes is to the contrary. Building on its 1906 
Act, Congress enacted the FDCA to bolster consumer  
protection against harmful products.93 
In this regard, the key issue appeared to be whether state remedies 
would upset the balance between the benefits and burdens of  
regulation struck by an expert federal agency, the FDA.94  
While there was some support for this argument based on the 
FDA’s statements in a regulatory preamble and in the statutory 
scheme,95 the majority concluded that the language and history of the 
statutory scheme reflected a primary purpose of protecting consumers 
by establishing a floor, and did not support the conclusion that the 
balance struck by the FDA foreclosed states from striking a different 
                                                                                                                 
92
 Id. at 1200 (“If Congress thought state-law suits posed an obstacle to its objectives, it 
surely would have enacted an express pre-emption provision at some point during the FDCA’s 
70-year history. . . . Its silence on the issue, coupled with its certain awareness of the prevalence 
of state tort litigation, is powerful evidence that Congress did not intend FDA oversight to be the 
exclusive means of ensuring drug safety and effectiveness.”). 
93
 Id. at 1199; see also id. at 1193 (quoting Vermont Supreme Court’s conclusion that 
federal warning requirements “‘create a floor, not a ceiling, for state regulation’”); id. at 1200 
(quoting preamble to FDA rule stating that federal requirements establish “both a ‘floor’ and a  
‘ceiling,’”); id. at 1202 (describing prior FDA statements that “cast federal labeling standards as 
a floor upon which States could build”); id. at 1204 (Breyer, J., concurring) (suggesting that 
FDA may describe “when labeling requirements serve as a ceiling as well as a floor” through 
specific regulations). 
94
 Neither the majority nor the dissent suggested a congressional purpose to rationalize 
standards so as to reduce transaction costs and promote interstate commerce. Although such a 
purpose might support the adoption of uniform federal standards, this purpose was apparently 
not a significant factor underlying the particular federal regulatory regime at issue in Wyeth. 
There would also appear to be no NIMBY problem in this context. 
95
 See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1219 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing regulatory scheme). 
Because Justice Alito, as well as Justice Scalia (who, together with Chief Justice Roberts, joined 
the dissent) reject reliance on legislative history as a tool of statutory construction, the dissent 
did not discuss any legislative history that might have supported its analysis. 
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balance.96 This analysis is consistent with our view that only the  
primary legislative purposes should be relevant to implied preemption 
analysis. We would add that this conclusion makes sense in terms of 
our collective action analysis because there was no suggestion by 
either the drug manufacturer or the dissent of congressional concern 
for the export of regulatory burdens by “downstream states” as a 
result of distorted state incentives. 
Third, the majority recognized the difference between state judicial 
remedies and direct regulation, observing that the “the jury verdict 
established only that [the] warning was insufficient. It did not  
mandate a particular replacement warning, nor did it require 
contraindicating” the method of drug administration approved by the 
FDA.97 In addition, the Court recognized that “Congress did not 
provide a federal remedy for consumers harmed by unsafe or 
ineffective drugs in the 1938 statute or in any subsequent amendment. 
Evidently, it determined that widely available state rights of action 
provided appropriate relief for injured consumers.”98 It would be 
particularly perverse if the effect of adoption of a federal statute 
whose primary purpose is to protect consumers were to leave them 
without a remedy for injuries suffered as a result of the use of 
products regulated under the statute.99 
                                                                                                                 
96
 Much of the discussion focused on the FDA’s argument for preemption set forth in a 
regulatory preamble, and on whether it warranted deference. The majority concluded that “[t]he 
weight we accord the agency’s explanation of state law’s impact on the federal scheme depends 
on its thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness.” Id. at 1201 (majority opinion) (citing 
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234–35 (2001); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 
134, 140 (1944)). Under this standard, according to the majority, the “preamble does not merit 
deference” because it represented an abrupt shift in the rule as proposed without notice or 
opportunity for comment and because it “is at odds with what evidence we have of Congress’ 
purposes, and it reverses the FDA’s own longstanding position without providing a reasoned 
explanation, including any discussion of how state law has interfered with the FDA’s regulation 
of drug labeling during decades of coexistence.” Id. at 1201. 
97
 Id. at 1194. 
98
 Id. at 1199. The Court referenced legislative history indicating that, as originally  
proposed, the statute did provide a federal remedy, which was removed because “witnesses 
testified that such a right of action was unnecessary because common-law claims were already 
available under state law.” Id. at 1199 n.7 (citing Hearings on S. 1944 Before a Subcomm. of the 
S. Comm. on Commerce, 73d Cong., 400, 403 (1933) (statements of W.A. Hines and J.A. 
Ladds)). 
99
 Even the dissenters in Wyeth, however, apparently would have allowed state tort suits to 
proceed, provided that they did not find liability for warnings that complied with federal  
requirements. See id. at 1231 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“To be sure, state tort suits can peacefully 
coexist with the FDA’s labeling regime, and they have done so for decades. But this case is far 
from peaceful coexistence. The FDA told Wyeth that Phenergan’s label renders its use ‘safe.’ 
But the State of Vermont, through its tort law, said: ‘Not so.’” (citation omitted)). 
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CONCLUSION 
We believe that federalism is, in many respects, a pragmatic  
response to collective action problems among states. From this  
perspective, collective action principles provide a powerful tool for 
analyzing federalism issues, including preemption. In this Article we 
have applied those principles to consider the issues raised by remedial 
preemption, an increasingly important and frequently litigated issue. 
Remedial preemption cases raise fundamental questions of how to 
balance the national interests that support federal regulation against 
the legitimate and powerful state interests in preserving access to 
courts and judicial remedies for injured parties. 
Our analysis suggests two essential points. First, preemption of 
state remedies is a form of “ceiling preemption” that is supported only 
when the primary purposes of federal regulation reflect concern that 
states have an incentive to overregulate. Such primary purposes  
include achieving uniform standards to reduce transactions costs,  
responding to the export of regulatory burdens to other states, and 
combating the NIMBY problem. Second, because state judicial  
remedies differ in important respects from state legislative rules, 
statutory language and purposes that support ceiling preemption of 
legislative rules do not necessarily support remedial preemption. In 
particular, the institutional structure of courts differs from that of  
legislatures. These differences insulate judges from the political 
pressures that create problematic incentives for legislatures. In 
addition, the states have an important interest in providing remedies 
and that interest is entitled to respect under preemption doctrine. 
Finally, the regulatory effect of common law tort remedies is less than 
that of legislative rules. As a result, it is often possible to 
accommodate the federal purpose within the remedial jurisprudence 
of the state courts without displacing that remedial authority entirely. 
Ultimately, we do not claim that our approach will provide easy 
answers to difficult preemption problems that will likely depend on 
the particulars of the federal statute and the state remedies at issue. 
We do believe, however, that our approach focuses on the right  
questions. 
